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 LINES AND FLOWS: THE BEGINNING AND 
END OF BORDERS* 
Alan D. Bersin** 
Border Lines 
he purpose and function of borders in world history has been and 
remains to delineate and demarcate—that is, to differentiate—one 
sovereignty from another. They are the juridical lines on a map, indicat-
ing the geographical place where imperial and/or national dominion be-
gins and ends. These shift over time as a result of political and military 
developments, usually followed by legal recognition or acknowledgment 
expressed in one form or another. History tells the tale of these develop-
ments and shifts. Like laws, borders embody and reflect history’s results 
with the narrative left out. 
The spaces of borders, corresponding to their map lines, are marked by 
ports of entry and exit. It is here where cross-border transactions of peo-
ple and goods are processed through the exercise of immigration and 
customs authorities. Typically, the scope of these border inspection au-
thorities is quite broad regardless of the legal system under which they 
operate. Sovereignty asserts itself aggressively at the border threshold to 
determine who and what has the right or privilege of entrance (inbound) 
and exit (outbound). The levying of customs fees and duties has generat-
ed critical revenue streams for governments since biblical times. It was 
no accident that one of the earliest acts of the First Congress during the 
Washington Administration was to establish the U.S. Customs Service in 
1789.1 
Borders define a homeland. They are the primary reference points for 
national defense strategy and homeland security policy. Throughout his-
tory, borders have been the site of fortification, intended variously to 
shut in or keep out people or things. China’s Great Wall in the second 
century BCE, France’s Maginot Line pre-World War II, the Soviets’ Ber-
                                                                                                             
 *  Originally presented at the Ira M. Belfer Lecture, Brooklyn Law School, October 
6, 2011. 
 **  Assistant Secretary of International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer (Former 
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) Department of Homeland Securi-
ty. 
 1. The U.S. Customs Service was established by the Fifth Act of the First Congress 
on July 31, 1789. About 1600-1799, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/1600-1799.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 
2010). 
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lin Wall in the twentieth century, and America’s Southwest border fence 
in the twenty-first century all serve to illustrate the point. It was made 
more poetic and timeless by Robert Frost in “Mending Wall” where he 
wrote “good fences make good neighbors.”2 
So, we see, borders are lines with real result and consequence. When 
we walk to the riverfront in El Paso and wade into the Rio Grande, at 
midstream it becomes the Rio Bravo and Juarez, Mexico begins. Without 
more, one crosses the line (la línea) from one of the safest cities in the 
Western Hemisphere (five homicides in 2010) to its most dangerous 
(3,400 homicides in 2010).3 Border lines matter but rarely account by 
themselves for the changes they embody. 
Borders as Flows 
More than a generation ago, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Thomas Kuhn introduced the notion of “paradigm” to refer to a distinc-
tive manner of viewing the world, a characteristic sense, which is shaped 
by the larger forces at work in an era.4 This way of seeing organizes all 
of the data that is around us—all surrounding sensations—into patterns 
that we can interpret and understand, and then act on to effect. Epochal 
shifts in paradigm catalyze enormous alterations in how we conduct op-
erations and do business at a particular point in time.5 The balance of this 
lecture addresses the massive paradigm change that has taken place since 
9/11 in our perception of borders not only as lines, but also as move-
ments—flows of people and goods on a global scale both legally and 
illegally. 
Global flows are not new. These have occurred since ancient times and 
are chronicled in the ages of discovery and exploration as seafaring mat-
ters, and much earlier in the movement of goods and people along the 
                                                                                                             
 2. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED 
POEMS, COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969). 
 3. Monica Ortiz Uribe, El Paso, San Diego Among Safest Cities, KPBS.ORG (Nov. 
22, 2010), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2010/nov/22/el-paso-san-diego-among-safest-
cities/. 
 4. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–13 (2d ed. 
1962). 
 5. In Kuhn’s context these shifts marked the transition from a Ptolemaic or preten-
tious way of seeing—the earth anchors the universe—to the materially more modest Co-
pernican one—the sun centers the solar system—and so on through a mechanical Newto-
nian model to the uncertainties inherent in the relativist paradigm captured by Einstein. 
Id. at 66–91. 
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Silk and Tea Horse Roads into China and the caravan paths across Ara-
bia.6 
Nor is the contemporary scale of the flows itself a distinguishing fac-
tor. These have increased exponentially century after century, spurred by 
colonial empires and trading companies, activities multiplied throughout 
by the growing logic of comparative advantage. The intensity, volume 
and speed of commercial and migratory flows accelerated mightily with 
the Industrial Revolution,7 and then massively again more recently by the 
invention of the jet engine and the Internet. The cumulative effect of the-
se trends is what we refer to as globalization—extraordinary cross-border 
flows of capital, goods, people, ideas, and images occurring routinely on 
a daily basis, facilitated by a digitalization of data that has created instan-
taneous communication and transaction. 
Security as the Organizing Principle: The Searing Impact of 9/11 
The vast volumes and growing speed in the movement of people and 
goods toward and across U.S. border lines from a globalized world is 
staggering. Each and every day in 2010, an average of 965,167 passen-
gers and pedestrians, 47,293 truck, rail, and sea containers,8 and 257,990 
privately owned vehicles entered the United States.9 Roughly $2 trillion 
in imports and $1.8 trillion in exports crossed our borders that same 
year.10 
The trauma of 9/11, inflicted by al Qaida on the world through the 
United States, assured that we would never view cross-border move-
ments in quite the same way. Transnational terrorism exploited the rela-
tive openness of our borders and laxness of our border regulatory re-
gimes to invade the continental United States for the first time since the 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Mark Jenkins, Tea Horse Road: The Forgotten Road, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
MAG. (May 2010), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/05/tea-horse-road/jenkins-
text. 
 7. Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Indus-
trial Revolution from 1880 to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897 (2009). 
 8. On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2010, CPB…, CBP.GOV (Feb. 25, 2011), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/accomplish/previous_year/fy10_stats/typical_day_fy2
010.xml. 
 9. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., IMPORT TRADE TRENDS: FISCAL YEAR 2010 
YEAR-END REPORT 18 (2010) [hereinafter IMPORT TRADE 2010 REPORT], available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/trade_programs/trade_trends/itt.ctt/itt.pdf. 
 10. Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, 
CBP.GOV (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml 
[hereinafter CBP 2010 in Review Fact Sheet]. 
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British burned government buildings in Washington during the War of 
1812.11 In one fell vicious swoop that was actual and deadly, and unlike 
the potential threat we had grown accustomed to during the Cold War, 
the events of 9/11 altered America’s view of security forever. 
The resulting sense of insecurity stemmed from the fact that our bor-
ders had been violated. The reflexive response was to hunker down be-
hind traditional concepts of borders as lines of defense. All planes were 
grounded and our maritime and aviation borders were closed in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11. Similarly, our land borders virtually shut 
down as each entering vehicle from Mexico and Canada was inspected 
thoroughly. In other less visible ways, America closed its borders 
through restrictions on the issuance of visas and other immigration bene-
fits. As Edward Alden has documented, many of these restrictions—
pertaining particularly to the grant of visas—persist today.12 
But all the emergency measures taken immediately after 9/11 collided 
head-on with the realities of global travel and commerce through transit 
zones and supply chains. They also directly challenged our self-image as 
an open, free, and welcoming society. The unacceptable economic and 
political consequences of shutting down the border, coupled with the 
new security imperative, forced a fundamental shift in our perspective. 
We began to understand that our borders begin not where our ports of 
entry are located, but rather, where passengers board air carriers and 
freight is loaded on maritime vessels bound for those ports of entry. In 
order to forge practical arrangements to take both travel and trade securi-
ty into account, borders needed to be viewed and managed as flows of 
people and goods as much as lines in the sand, on the water, or through 
the air. 
In the ten years since 9/11, three terrorist plots targeting the United 
States involved cross border movements of people or goods.13 Each event 
                                                                                                             
 11. American territory, of course, was again invaded in 1941 by Japan’s sneak attack 
at Pearl Harbor. 
 12. Edward Alden, Companies Take Action as Visa Curbs Hurt Trade, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2003, at 7. See generally EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN 
BORDER: TERROISM, IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11 (Harper Collins Publishers 
2008). 
 13. In addition, we have been subject to “home-grown” terrorist events such as that 
carried out at Fort Hood by Maj. Nidal Hasan, the attack on the New York subway sys-
tem planned by Najibullah Zazi and the murder of a military recruiter in Arkansas. Rob-
ert D. McFadden, Army Doctor Held in Ft. Hood Rampage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06forthood.html?ref=nidalmalikhasan. 
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makes the case powerfully for the new border paradigm that links juris-
dictional lines to flows toward them. 
The first involved the so-called underwear bomber, Nigerian citizen 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who boarded a plane in the Netherlands 
intending to ignite PETN explosive material and blow up a Northwest 
Airlines flight over Detroit.14 Based on its targeting capabilities, Customs 
and Border Protection (“CBP”) identified Abdulmutallab as a person of 
interest after the flight departed.15 When the plane arrived in the United 
States and he presented himself for admission, officers would have re-
ferred him to secondary inspection for significant interrogation. This ob-
viously would have been too late, because had he succeeded, he would 
have blown up the plane before it landed. Border security in this context 
requires that Abdulmutallab be prevented from boarding the plane in the 
first place. For these purposes, the border became Schipol Airport in 
Amsterdam, and the goal changed to the identification and preemption of 
high risk individuals in the flow of passengers at their last point of depar-
ture toward the United States. 
The second case was Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square Bomber, a nat-
uralized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, who went abroad to receive train-
ing from the Taliban in the tribal borderlands between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.16 Shahzad received support and resources in the New York 
metropolitan area from abroad to construct an explosive device he in-
tended to detonate in Times Square. Foiled by an alert guard, Shahzad 
attempted to flee the country on board an Emirates Airlines plane. Ad-
vance passenger manifest information received by CBP regarding the 
outbound flight, coupled with significant travel history data available 
concerning Shahzad, facilitated his identification and apprehension on 
the tarmac at JFK seconds before takeoff. 
                                                                                                             
 14. Kenneth Chang, Explosive on Flight 253 is Among Most Powerful, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/us/28explosives.html. 
 15. Ten Years after 9/11: Can Terrorists Still Exploit Our Visa System?: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec. Subcomm. on Border & Mar. Sec., 112th Cong. 
2 (2011) (statement of Edward J. Ramotowski, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Visa Services, 
Dep’t of State), available at 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Ramotowski.pd
f. 
 16. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Evidence Mounts for Taliban Role in Bomb Plot, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/nyregion/06bomb.html. 
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The third terrorist plot was the shipment of parcel bombs by al Qaida 
operatives in the Arabian Peninsula via UPS and Federal Express.17 Sent 
from Yemen, addressed to locations in Chicago, the improvised explo-
sive devices passed through airports in London and Dubai, after having 
been concealed in printer cartridges and timed to detonate over the Unit-
ed States. As a result of intelligence-sharing by Saudi authorities, we 
were able to deploy public and private sector resources to locate the 
packages before they reached their intended destinations. As in the other 
cases, the key lay in the collection, analysis, and sharing of data regard-
ing the transnational origin, route, and flow, in this instance, of express 
carrier packages. 
We understand our mission at CBP, within the Department of Home-
land Security (“DHS”), from this perspective: keeping dangerous people 
and dangerous things away from the American homeland. We strive to 
accomplish this mission by exercising our authorities and utilizing our 
resources in a way that enlists both time and space as allies. The earlier 
that we can identify, intercept, and neutralize threats to the homeland, the 
safer our people will be. The further away geographically from the phys-
ical line that we can achieve these ends, the safer our country will be. 
The job for DHS, in short, is to secure flows of people and goods moving 
toward, and intending to enter, the United States. This altered paradigm 
regarding our mission has fundamental implications for DHS’s strategic 
and tactical approach to organization and function, as well as to relation-
ships with other agencies within and outside the government. 
Joint Border Management 
The terrorist invasion of 9/11 gave rise to a preoccupation with the 
safety of the American homeland. The concept of homeland itself was 
novel, even uncomfortable for many in the U.S. context. It differed strik-
ingly from our earlier emphasis on new frontiers in Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s thesis,18 or the “manifest destiny” that drove an aggressive ex-
                                                                                                             
 17. Erika Solomon & Phil Stewart, Al Qaeda Yemen Wing Claims Parcel Plot, UPS 
Crash, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-usa-
yemen-bomb-idUSTRE6A44PU20101105. 
 18. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 
in 
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER: WISCONSIN’S HISTORIAN OF THE FRONTIER 26–47 (Martin 
Ridge ed., 1986). 
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pansion of both northern and southern borders in the United States dur-
ing the nineteenth century.19 
This new focus generated creation of DHS, a merger by legislative fiat 
in 2003, of twenty-two agencies spread previously across the landscape 
of American government.20 CBP itself was formed through the merger of 
four separate organizations from three separate cabinet departments into 
one new agency—the U.S. Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service from the Department of Justice, dealing with people seek-
ing to enter the country legally and illegally; the U.S. Customs Service 
from the Treasury Department, dealing with cargo and goods; and the 
Agriculture Inspection Service from the Department of Agriculture, deal-
ing with agricultural pests and potential infestation of our crop lands.21 
Our previous scheme of divided border management, in place since the 
nineteenth century, was not efficient to say the least. But it was respon-
sive to history. As John Barth, borrowing a bit from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, noted in The End of the Road, “There’s no reason in the long 
run why Italy shouldn’t be shaped like a sausage instead of a boot, but 
that doesn’t happen to be the case. The world is everything that is the 
case, and what the case is is not a matter of logic.”22 I learned this first 
hand in the 1990s as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. Appointed the so-called Border Czar in the Clinton Administra-
tion, and tasked to “coordinate” federal law enforcement from southern 
California to South Texas, success in the position was limited by the ex-
isting structure of separate stove pipes zealously maintained by bureau-
cratic rivalry and an unending competition for resources. 
These tensions were swept aside in the crucible of 9/11 and unified 
border management was created for the first time in American history; 
and, it happens, for the first time across the globe in the world’s history. 
Immigration, customs, and agricultural inspection authorities23 exercised 
by the same officer working for a single agency defined by an overarch-
                                                                                                             
 19. See generally ALBERT KATZ WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF 
NATIONALIST EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Quadrangle Books 1963) (1935). 
 20. History: Who Became Part of the Department?, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 21. See The Future is Now, U.S. CUSTOMS TODAY (Feb. 2003), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2003/February/future.xml. 
 22. JOHN BARTH, THE END OF THE ROAD 76 (rev. ed. 1967) (emphasis omitted). 
 23. CBP also serves as the single executive agent for forty other federal agencies 
charged with administrative or regulatory duties regarding incoming and outgoing people 
and things. These include, notably, the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation. 
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ing security mission, invented the institution of joint border management 
and the science and art of modern border protection. It sounds so sensi-
ble, and in practice it has turned out to be so. But it would not have come 
to pass in the absence of crisis, and we remain virtually alone in imple-
menting it comprehensively.24 I venture to project that over the next gen-
eration most nations will turn to joint border management and wonder in 
retrospect, as we do, how they could have functioned otherwise. As Ar-
thur Schopenhauer, the philosopher, aptly noted: “Every truth passes 
through three stages . . . [F]irst, it is ridiculed[;]. . . [S]econd, it is [vio-
lently] opposed [;] . . . [and T]hird, it is regarded as self-evident.”25 
Toward An Integrated National and Homeland Security Enterprise 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002,26 establishing DHS, involved the 
largest reorganization of executive branch operations since formation of 
the National Military Establishment in 1947, subsequently renamed as 
the Department of Defense (“DOD”) in 1949.27 Composed of 240,000 
employees,28 DHS is the third largest cabinet agency after DOD and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.29 Although the corporate mergers within 
DHS and CBP are complete, the development and realization of an inte-
grated mission—in terms of both homeland security and border protec-
tion—remain very much a work in process. The experience of DOD is 
instructive. 
Established after World War II, the DOD was formed by breaking the 
Army/Air Force into separate components, then combining them with the 
                                                                                                             
 24. Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia are among a handful of countries 
which have taken steps, large and small, toward unification. Each, however, has stopped 
short of a full merger of responsibilities. The Canadian Border Services Agency  for ex-
ample, regulates the ports of entry while the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, separately 
governed, acts between the ports of entry and elsewhere through the interior of the coun-
try. The Australian Customs and Border Protection Services shares border-related re-
sponsibilities with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The United Kingdom 
Border Agency, authorized to enforce immigration laws and collect customs duties, is not 
charged with counter-terrorist responsibilities. 
 25. THE HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 451 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed., 3d ed. 1993) 
(quoting Arthur Schopenhauer) [hereinafter HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS]. 
 26. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 27. About the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://www.defense.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) [hereinafter About the DOD]. 
 28. About, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/ (last updated Feb. 
13, 2012). 
 29. The Executive Branch, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
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Navy and Marines,30 and affiliating the Coast Guard, at that time in the 
Treasury Department.31 While the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
worked from the outset toward new mechanisms of coordination, the 
proud legacies of the individual branches were retained—even fiercely 
maintained—and the process was slow-going. The lack of a genuinely 
integrated mission with corresponding joint operations was conspicuous 
by its absence. When the centrifugal forces at work became tragically 
apparent in the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 (and the 
fractured and uneven operation in Grenada to protect U.S. citizens a few 
years later), Congress stepped in and enacted the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act,32 requiring purposeful integration and “jointness” in operational 
planning and execution.33 DOD has been working toward successful in-
tegration ever since, resulting in impressive military results. The latest 
evidence to convince remaining doubters, not few and far between 
among some admirals and generals, was the flawless, U.S. casualty-free, 
operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, to eliminate Osama bin Laden.34 
We remain at a very early stage of institutional evolution within DHS 
and CBP with such integrated operations. It likely will take a generation 
or more to achieve, as was the case with DOD. Hopefully, history will 
spare us many devastating, precipitating, and accelerating events. 
There remains a second compelling requirement for mission integra-
tion within the realm of border protection and homeland security. I refer 
to the larger relationship between the military and law enforcement. The 
intellectual—largely legal—engineering necessary to create a revised 
theory that properly aligns these functions and clearly delineates home-
land security as a species of national security remains in its infancy. The 
consequences show up in a variety of places. We struggle to determine 
whether to try terrorists as criminals in federal court or as enemy com-
                                                                                                             
 30. About the DOD, supra note 27. 
 31. The Coast Guard became part of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. 
Coast Guard History: When Was the Coast Guard Established?, U.S. COAST GUARD, 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/faqs/when.asp (last modified Jan. 31, 2012). 
 32. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)). 
 33. Bruce Berkowitz, Intelligence Reform: Less Is More, HOOVER DIGEST (Apr. 30, 
2004), http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6809. 
 34. Peter Baker, Helene Cooper & Mark Mazzetti, Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-
laden-is-killed.html?_r=1&hp. 
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batants before military tribunals.35 We cling to posse comitatus as a con-
stitutional bulwark, yet at the same time many fear it may be an anachro-
nism in an environment of transnational crime and terror.36 
In short, the old dichotomies, and our historic American reconciliation 
of them, no longer serve unquestionably as certain stars by which we can 
reliably navigate. The current military activities in Afghanistan seem less 
connected with obtaining classical geopolitical advantage than with as-
suring that country, or any other country, will not provide a base from 
which dangerous people and dangerous things can be launched against 
the United States. Although means and methods differ, this focus is iden-
tical to our border protection mission of securing flows of people and 
goods toward the homeland. There are distinctions here with a real dif-
ference to be sure. However, I submit, they need to be re-examined and 
re-analyzed carefully in a borderless world marked by continuums and 
flows rather than bright lines alone. 
Making Data Into Useable Information 
If borders are flows of people and goods, then those charged with se-
curing and regulating those flows must confront the reality that ninety-
seven to ninety-eight percent of the traffic is composed of lawful and 
compliant trade and travel.37 The goal to identify and interdict dangerous 
passengers and cargo from among this otherwise legitimate mass gener-
ates a requirement to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk subjects. 
Risk assessment thereby emerges as the keystone of border manage-
ment. Information, in turn, becomes central to the evaluation of risk 
while data are the building blocks of timely and actionable information. 
To fulfill its mission CBP has developed the U.S. government’s largest 
collection, storage, and dissemination functions with respect to unclassi-
fied data. On a typical day, CBP exchanges 1.35 billion electronic mes-
sages with other government agencies, transportation carriers, customs 
brokers, and the plethora of additional participants in global travel net-
works and supply chains. These analytical communications are managed 
by CBP’s National Targeting Centers for Passengers and Cargo, located 
in Virginia. They permit access, respectively, to records of each traveler 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Civilian, Military Trials Prosecute Terrorism Suspects Differently, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 22, 2009, 11:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-
11-22-civilian-vs-military-trials_N.htm. 
 36. See Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse 
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99–144 (2003). 
 37. IMPORT TRADE 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 18. 
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and every cargo shipment—land, sea, and air—that have crossed a U.S. 
border through a port of entry during the past eight years, legally or ille-
gally. Sophisticated rule searches, utilizing complex algorithms, scan this 
data for both known and unknown threats based on potential risks identi-
fied by DHS and the intelligence community. Targeting in this fashion 
enhances our capacity to find the dangerous people and dangerous things 
for which we are on the lookout at the border. Each border-related trans-
action is scrutinized in this way. 
The logic in this environment of information data sharing and access is 
highlighted. In the modern age, what we learned as children remains true 
as ever: information is power. However, the traditional moral has been 
upended entirely. Those who hoard information today, expecting their 
power to grow by forcing others to ask for it, soon find themselves iso-
lated and, over time, ignored. The abundance of data and the prolifera-
tion online of alternative sources of information place a premium on 
sharing; one’s information becomes more valuable, i.e., useful and ac-
tionable, by leveraging it off of other information and data embodying 
and reflecting additional reference points that facilitate a connecting of 
dots. 
The implications for bureaucracy are significant as are the tensions 
with conventional “silo” or “stove-piped” organizational arrangements. 
As Lawrence Wright makes clear in The Looming Tower, the CIA and 
the FBI discovered in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that information 
unshared in their separate files contained much of what, had it been 
combined, would have revealed the al Qaida conspiracy.38 To the credit 
of these agencies, the data and information sharing between them, while 
not perfect, has increased exponentially during the past decade. This 
shared counter-terrorist intelligence and information, together with for-
eign travel-related data supplied by CBP, has proven its worth to home-
land security time and time again.39 
                                                                                                             
 38. See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 
9/11 (2006). 
 39. Two notable cases involve the arrest and conviction of U.S. lawful permanent 
resident Najibullah Zazi and U.S. born citizen David Coleman Headley, formerly known 
as Daood Sayed Gilani. See United States v. Zazi, No. 09-CR-663, 2010 WL 2710605 
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 830-4, 2011 WL 
1326373, at *1–5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2011). Zazi was recruited by al Qaida to conduct sui-
cide attacks using explosives against the New York City subway system. See Zazi, 2010 
WL 2710605, at *1. Headley helped plan the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai in con-
cert with al Qaida and Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba. See Kash-
miri, 2011 WL 1326373, at *1–2; Sebastian Rotella, The American Behind India’s 9/11—
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The obstacles to this happening quickly outside of the counter-terrorist 
context should not be underestimated. On the international front, border-
related data sharing, even among the closest of allies, remains in a primi-
tive stage. Old-fashioned limited views of national interest and reflexive 
notions of privacy and civil liberties restrict willingness to share and re-
inforce parochial and myopic concerns of long duration. 
Similar influences operate in the domestic sphere where deep-seated 
bureaucratic divisions persist. This is particularly true when different 
perspectives on mission are brought to a crime scene. For investigators, 
guided by the criminal justice model, information is maintained on close 
hold in case files and evaluated for its potential as “admissible evidence” 
in a prosecution. For the cop on the beat, this same information may be 
crucial intelligence key to crime prevention activity at the moment. Fail-
ure to act on the information in deference to its subsequent use in the 
courtroom is the current rule rather than the exception. Over time, this 
cultural habit of mind will give way to the logic and compelling benefits 
of intelligence and information sharing. Hopefully, again, catastrophic 
consequence need not be the mid-wife of inevitable change. 
Expediting Legitimate Trade and Travel as a Security Regime 
The long-held view posits that security and trade are independent vari-
ables competing in a zero sum game. According to conventional wisdom, 
trade facilitation, the expedited movement of commerce, and security 
(ensuring the safety of that commerce) must be balanced to an optimal 
equilibrium. The concept of “so much security” in exchange for “so 
much delay” in the processing of trade has governed port of entry opera-
tions for generations. Risk management, however, comprehensively ap-
plied, leaves this notion not only theoretically false but also practically 
counter-productive and self-defeating. 
Short of examining every piece of straw separately, there are only two 
ways one can find the proverbial needle in a haystack. The first is to have 
very specific intelligence about where the needle is so that you can reach 
into the middle of the haystack and pluck it out. Every once in a while, 
but with increasing frequency, we have access to that kind of granulated 
intelligence. That is what occurred in the case of the UPS and FedEx 
parcels from Yemen. We received very concrete information and were 
able to reach into the global flow of millions of packages then in transit 
and ferret out the precise two packages laden with explosives. 
                                                                                                             
And How U.S. Botched Chances to Stop Him, PRO PUBLICA (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:52 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist. 
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But we cannot always count on that kind of actionable intelligence. So 
the only other way to find the needle in the haystack is to make the hay-
stack smaller. And the way to make the stack smaller is to differentiate 
routinely between high- and low-risk subjects, and expedite movement of 
the latter through the global system. 
In fact, segmenting traffic flows according to risk is a necessary condi-
tion of heightening border security at any level of resource allocation. 
We expedite lawful trade and travel through border controls so that we 
may focus our scarce regulatory and inspectional resources on that traffic 
about which we have derogatory information, or about which we lack 
sufficient information to make a sound judgment regarding its legitima-
cy. Moving ordinary travelers and regular cargo quickly through ports of 
entry, therefore, is not only good for the economy, but given the volumes 
we confront, it is essential to the security function itself. 
Expediting trade and heightened security, accordingly, are neither anti-
thetical to one another nor are they mutually exclusive matters requiring 
balance. To the contrary, they are part and parcel of a single process. 
This approach to managing flows has become the cornerstone of our sys-
tem of border management in the United States. 
CBP is re-engineering its internal trade functions and field inspection 
protocols to embody this regulatory model. Trusted Traveler and Trusted 
Shipper initiatives are central elements key to the strategy.40 Global En-
try is a security program that extends expedited clearance to pre-
approved low-risk air travelers entering the Unites States.41 The NEXUS 
and SENTRI programs operate similarly to expedite passage through our 
land border crossings with Canada and Mexico respectively.42 Compara-
ble benefits in the cargo context are conferred on members of the Cus-
toms/Trade Partnership against Terrorism (“C-TPAT”) program.43 
These trusted partner programs offer the same “grand bargain”: in ex-
change for sharing information with the government that permits it to vet 
the security status and background of participating persons and entities, 
                                                                                                             
 40. Budget Hearing Before the H. Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Homeland 
Sec., 112th Cong. 181–87 (2011) (testimony of Comm’r Alan Bersin, U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot.), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1300738129469.shtm. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Trusted Traveler Programs, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 43. See C-TPAT: Overview, CBP.GOV, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_overview.xml 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
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the government commits itself to two reciprocal obligations.44 First, it 
will maintain the information received in confidence and utilize it solely 
for the purpose it was given. Second, the traveler, importer, or shipper, 
once vetted and deemed trusted, will receive the benefit of expedited 
movement into the country. 
The dynamic here highlights the crucial importance of genuine part-
nerships with the public and private sectors as well as with other coun-
tries. What is required here is not only the intensification of partnership 
but a change in the quality and nature of the interaction. Yesterday’s pre-
vailing mode—government mandate and private sector compliance—
must give way to the model of a co-created regulatory regime that em-
bodies the “grand bargain” from the outset in reacting to evolving terror-
ist/transnational crime threats. The joint public-private response in the 
aftermath of the Yemen cargo plots, Air Cargo Advance Screening 
(“ACAS”),45 captures the requirement and best illustrates the optimal 
way forward. Through advance information and early decision-making 
by all participants in the air cargo supply chain, to include CBP, the 
Transportation Security Administration, air carriers, freight forwarders, 
and international postal administrations, we are able to co-create a pro-
cess to reduce the “haystack” and take action on the “needles” as early in 
the process as possible. Ultimately, the goal is to establish global re-
quirements for advance information and ensure that high risk cargo iden-
tified by ACAS is physically screened under the appropriate regulatory 
framework and protocols.46 
Absent authentic collaboration of this kind, we cannot surmount the 
challenge of scaling up these programs of trust and confidence such that 
they will yield at once satisfactory material effect on both our security 
profile and our economic competitiveness.47 Less is not more here, and 
Malcolm Gladwell’s “tipping point” is the goal.48 
                                                                                                             
 44. IMPORT TRADE 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 1–18. 
 45. Cargo Security: Advance Electronic Information & Screening, IATA (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/tracker/october-2011/pages/security.aspx. 
 46. An analogous approach to the regulation of passengers in the context of interna-
tional partnerships exists in the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”). VWP travelers must use 
secure, machine-readable travel documents and obtain pre-travel authorization from the 
Electronic System for Travel Authorization before embarking for the United States. 
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ened security standards that are periodically verified and offer visa-free travel to U.S. 
citizens and nationals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1732(c) (2006). 
 47. Commencing in December 2010, CBP has integrated its trusted traveler programs 
by extending Global Entry benefits to NEXUS and SENTRI members and vice-versa. 
Global Entry Expansion Federal Notice Published, CBP.GOV (Dec. 29, 2010), 
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United States, Mexico, and Canada: An Intermestic North America 
The new border paradigm has special implications—and holds out spe-
cial promise—for our land border neighbors to the north and south. 
The situation is unique, first because of the physical proximity of our 
geography. We share 1,900 border miles with Mexico and 5,400 miles of 
border with Canada (including those between Alaska and the Yukon). A 
second dimension of uniqueness stems from history. Following armed 
conflicts with each of our neighbors in the nineteenth century, treaties 
and subsequent peaceful territorial adjustments have blessed us with the 
longest demilitarized land borders in the world.49 
These developments in space and over time have created a relationship 
between the United States and each of Mexico and Canada that is equally 
unique. It is a relationship that is neither international in the classical 
sense nor is it domestic—of course, given the existence of separate sov-
ereignties. Instead, to use a phrase coined by Bayless Manning in the 
1970s, the relationship is “intermestic.”50 
Notwithstanding all of this, the fact remains that our borders with 
Mexico and Canada have been and remain largely inefficient from the 
standpoint of managing flows of people and cargo. The reason for this is 
                                                                                                             
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/travel_news/global_published.xml. Nearly one mil-
lion persons presently participate. CBP 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, supra note 10. More 
than ten-thousand companies are validated in the C-TPAT Cargo security program. C-
TPAT Reaches 10,000 Members, 4 FRONTLINE MAG., no. 1, Winter 2011, at 5, available 
at http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/frontline/winter_frontline2011.pdf. On the international front, 
CBP has developed and continues to strengthen supply chain security through “mutual 
recognition agreements” with trusted partners in cargo, including New Zealand, Canada, 
Jordan, Japan, Korea, and the European Union. CBP has non-binding trusted traveler 
agreements with Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Korea, Germa-
ny, Brazil, and Qatar. See Susan Holliday, Global Entry Takes Off: Private-Sector Sup-
port Fuels Boost in Frequent Flier Program, 4 FRONTLINE MAG., no. 1, Winter 2011, at 
11, available at http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/frontline/winter_frontline2011.pdf. 
 48. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000). 
 49. The Rush-Bagot Treaty in 1817 with Canada (through Britain following the War 
of 1812) and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, concluding the U.S.-Mexico War, 
established lasting peace. Additional boundary agreements were reached amicably: with 
Canada (British North America) through the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) and the 
Oregon Treaty (1846), and with Mexico through the Gadsden Purchase (1853). See Mile-
stones, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones (follow “1801-1829” 
or “1830-1860” hyperlink; then select border agreement name) (last visited Feb. 26, 
2012). 
 50. Bayless Manning, The Congress, The Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three 
Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 309 (1977). 
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the asymmetry between us and our neighbors.51 Only at the border line 
are we equal as a matter of juridical power as nowhere else in the bilat-
eral relationship. At the border, our neighbors have jealously guarded the 
prerogatives of sovereignty to reinforce their national pride and identity 
and to avoid political, economic, and cultural domination by the “colos-
sus” on their threshold. Porfirio Díaz, Mexico’s ruler between 1877 and 
1880 and again between 1884 and 1911, summarized the sentiment: 
“Poor Mexico, so far from God and so near to the United States.”52 Par-
ticularly pronounced in Mexico, the same sense has existed among Ca-
nadians, albeit expressed on different issues and in different ways.53 
Reimagining and then reinventing our borders with Mexico and Canada 
in the context of trade flows and the flows of people has become crucial 
on both security and economic grounds. 
Regarding commerce, the emergence of global trading blocs highlights 
the imperative of viewing U.S. economic prosperity increasingly from 
the perspective of enhancing North American competitiveness. To com-
pete successfully over the next half century with East Asia, the Indian 
subcontinent, and Brazil, we must take the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) to the next level.54 The critical path to this end is 
increasing significantly the efficiency of our borders in order to reduce 
                                                                                                             
 51. The populations of the United States, Canada, and Mexico are 313 million, 34 
million and 113 million, respectively. Country Comparison: Population, in CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (July 2011) [hereinafter WORLD 
FACTBOOK], available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html. Economically, their gross domestic products are 
$15.04 trillion (U.S.), $1.39 trillion (Canada), and $1.657 trillion. Field Listing: GDP 
(Purchasing Power Parity), in WORLD FACTBOOK, supra, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2001.html. 
 52. HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 25, at 31; Chronology of Leading His-
torical Events in Mexico, in RANDOLPH WELLFORD SMITH, BENIGHTED MEXICO 383 
(1916). 
 53. See, e.g., Meg Bortin, Global Poll Shows Wide Distrust of United States, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/news/27iht-
pew.4.6365578.html?pagewanted=all. 
 54. Known as Tratado de Libre Comercio (“TLC”) in Mexico, NAFTA dramatically 
expanded annual U.S. trade flows (imports and exports) with Canada ($525.3 billion in 
2010) and Mexico ($393 billion in 2010), making them our first and third largest com-
mercial partners. Top Trading Partners, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1012yr.html (last updat-
ed July 12, 2011). The second, fourth and fifth rankings belong respectively, to China 
($456.8 billion in 2010), Japan ($180.9 billion in 2010) and Germany ($130.9 billion in 
2010). Id. 
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current cross-border transactional costs by ten to twenty percent or more 
on the “NAFTA Highway.” 
With respect to security, the focus must shift from an exclusive one on 
land border lines, north and south, to one concerned with the necessity 
for “continental perimeter security.”55 This approach would have Cana-
da, the United States, and Mexico jointly identifying and intercepting 
dangerous people and things as they move in global flows toward the 
North American continent. The length of our land borders, coupled with 
the economic need to avoid “thickening” them (in the Canadian phrase), 
commends this course. The model here is the North American Air De-
fense (“NORAD”) command that enables Canada and the United States 
to jointly track and defend the northern continental airspace from avia-
tion threats to it.56 
Under President Obama’s leadership, there is considerable progress to 
report on both the economic and security fronts with both Mexico and 
Canada. In May 2010, the President, together with Mexican President 
Felipe Calderon, issued the Twenty-First Century Border Management 
declaration.57 Substantially recasting the strategic relationship, the decla-
ration decisively moved the bilateral relationship away from the accu-
satory conversations of the past over migration and narcotics. Acknowl-
edging the U.S. national security stake in Mexico’s historic struggle 
against organized crime, the two presidents adopted a doctrine of “co-
responsibility” for both legal and illegal flows across the border. View-
ing drugs and alien smuggling coming north and guns and bulk cash go-
ing south as a single vicious cycle of criminality has created the condi-
tions for bi-national law enforcement cooperation that was unthinkable 
even five years ago. 
The Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision of Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness declaration (“Beyond the Border declara-
tion”), created in February 2011 by President Obama and Canadian 
                                                                                                             
 55. See, e.g., John Noble, Fortress America or Fortress North America, 11 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 461 (2005). 
 56. Canadian and U.S. military forces rotate NORAD command responsibilities. On 
9/11, for example, General Ralph Eberhart of the USAF was the military officer in charge 
of leading NORAD’s response to the terrorist attack and his Deputy Commander was 
Lieutenant-General Kenneth Pennie of the Canadian Forces Air Command. See Adam J. 
Hebert, The Return of NORAD, 85 AIR FORCE MAG., no. 2., Feb. 2002, at 50. 
 57. Twenty-First Century Border Management, U.S.-Mex., May 19, 2010 (declara-
tion of U.S. Pres. Obama & Mex. Pres. Calderon), available at 
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Prime Minister Stephen Harper, represents an equally stunning departure 
in the context of United States-Canadian relations.58 Building upon a 
longer standing and deeper foundation of trust, the Beyond the Border 
declaration has generated a staggeringly ambitious action plan that en-
compasses the entire breadth of the United States-Canada security and 
economic competitiveness agendas. It forthrightly addresses matters that 
had been deferred politely in the past, ranging from information sharing 
to the pre-inspection of cargo and the reciprocal carrying of weapons by 
law enforcement personnel stationed in each other’s country. 
These course corrections and strides in U.S. policy have been navi-
gated in parallel process with our neighbors, respecting sensitivities of 
sovereignty on both ends, as well as the differences and the difficulties 
inherent in the negotiations. Nonetheless, the stage has been set for an 
increasingly trilateral discussion over the next generation that holds out 
enormous promise for the three countries and the North America they 
share. 
Conclusion 
The French poet Paul Valéry has observed: “The [challenge of] our 
times is that the future is not what it used to be.”59 The themes explored 
here will remain the subjects of security and economic developments 
over the next decades as we experience their domestic, international, and 
intermestic effects. Through the lens of lines and flows, we see both an 
old end and the new beginning of borders. 
                                                                                                             
 58. Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Com-
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